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and Human Services for bioterrorism preparedness,
part of over $1bn in nationwide funding announced in
2002.8 Similarly, North Dakota’s Governor Hoeven
announced $300 000 in funding for preventing heart
disease and stroke9; this can be compared with the $7m
designated for bioterrorism preparedness in the state.
Owing to funding for prevention of bioterrorism, state
health departments increased by 132% the number of
staff in epidemiology to work on preparedness for
infectious disease and terrorism between 2001 and
2003.8 But with this increase in funding came
additional mandates related to bioterrorism, with 66%
of health departments struggling to allocate time for
general planning and 55% having problems establish-
ing even basic systems for disease surveillance.6
More recently (in March 2005), the New York Times
said surveillance for anthrax “rattled the stock market
[and] set the White House on alert.”10A subsequent
article reported that congressional auditors had found
that FBI funds designated for investigating fraud in
health care seemed to have been improperly shifted to
other purposes, including fighting terrorism, over the
past three years.11 In defence, Joseph L Ford, the FBI’s
chief financial officer, said the attacks of 11 September
2001 “demanded an instant, 100 percent commitment
toward counterterrorism.”11
The responses to the perceived importance of the
threat go even further. For example, the Pentagon has
proposed that it should be exempted from aspects of the
clean air and hazardous waste recovery acts, including
capping its “legal liability for cleaning up polluted sites
once it sells land to a new owner, and allowing military
areas that do not meet national air standards to remain
that way for an additional three years.”12And Associated
Press reported that 34 of the military bases that have
been shut down since 1988 are on the Environmental
Protection Agency’s superfund list of worst toxic waste
sites (most of them have been on the list for at least 15
years) and none are completely cleaned.13
These observations are not intended to diminish
the tragedies of 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005 or
other terrorist actions or catastrophes, nor to negate
the importance of developing effective and humane
ways of making sure such tragedies are not repeated.
Nor do I intend to suggest that all the blame for
catastrophic or everyday events should be attributed to
any government, or that any quantity of redirected
funds could completely erase these events. It is
certainly justifiable for governments to appropriate
substantial funds to prevent potential future threats to
our security. But public funding for current threats
should not be compromised. Predictable tragedies
happen every day. We know strategies to reduce deaths
from tobacco, alcohol, poor diet, unintentional injuries,
and other predictable causes. And we know that
millions of people will die unless we protect the popu-
lation against these routine causes of death.
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British drinking: a suitable case for treatment?
Cut tax on low alcohol drinks, curb drink driving, and offer brief interventions
The rising consumption of alcohol per capita inBritain over the past 20 years has producedlarge increases in the prevalence of alcoholic
cirrhosis, alcohol related violence, and heavy alcohol
use, costing the British economy around £30bn
($55bn; €44bn) a year.1 About 7.5% of men and 2.1% of
women in Britain are dependent on alcohol, among
the highest rates in the European Union.2
Two papers in this issue show that two relatively brief
psychosocial interventions—motivational enhancement
treatment and social network therapy—are effective and
cost effective in treating alcohol dependence, when
delivered under routine clinical conditions in the
NHS.3 4 The UK government could realise its stated aim
of increasing access to effective treatments for alcohol
dependence by investing in these interventions.
Britain also urgently needs to reduce the high rates
of high risk drinking that produce dependence, health
problems, and public disorder. Epidemiologists see the
key drivers of rising consumption as the reduced price
of alcohol, its increased availability, and its extensive
promotion in British cities.5 6 These changes have
resulted from the enthusiasm for deregulation that is
shared by governments in most developed countries,
now treating alcohol like any other commodity.
The UK government’s new alcohol policy,1 which
includes “partnership” with the alcohol industry, shows
all the hallmarks of regulatory capture6 in that it
embraces the industry’s diagnosis and preferred
remedies for the “alcohol problem.” The problem, in
the industry’s view, is a “minority” of drinkers who
engage in antisocial behaviour and put their health at
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risk; the preferred remedies are public education about
safe drinking, improved policing, better treatment for
alcohol problems, and self regulation by the alcohol
industry—the policies which evidence suggests are the
least likely to reduce problem drinking.5–7
The UK government has foregone the use of the
most effective policy to reduce hazardous drinking:
using taxation to increase the price of the beverages
containing the highest concentrations of alcohol.5 It
justifies this decision by saying that increased price has
not been shown definitely to reduce harm due to alco-
hol,1 an assertion at odds with the views of the world’s
leading researchers on alcohol.5 8
The government has also rejected any policies that
would reduce the availability of alcohol. Instead, it
embraces the paradoxical idea that allowing drinking
for up to 24 hours a day for seven days a week will
reduce binge drinking and public disorder. It believes
that, somehow, longer trading hours will help to create
a continental drinking culture in Britain. This proposal
has caused understandable consternation among
British judges, police, the Royal College of Physicians,
medical researchers, and alcohol experts.8–10
Experience in Australia suggests that even a govern-
ment bent on deregulation could do better.7 Over the
past two decades Australia has expanded alcohol
availability, liberalised trading hours, and not increased
overall taxation on alcohol. In 1980-2000 in the United
Kingdom per capita alcohol consumption increased by
31%, but in Australia it fell by 24%—as did many of the
indicators of alcohol related harm that increased so
steeply in the United Kingdom.7
Australia has imposed lower taxes on low alcohol
(less than 3.8%) beer than full strength beer. Also, all
states defined drink driving as driving with a blood
alcohol concentration over 0.05% (rather than 0.08%
as in the United Kingdom). Drink driving laws have
also been enforced vigorously by well publicised, large
scale random breath testing in the largest states. The
immediate and sustained reduction in deaths and seri-
ous injuries from road crashes that followed the intro-
duction of random breath testing in the largest
Australian state ensured strong public support for
continuing the policy.11 Low alcohol beer now accounts
for 40% of all beer consumed in Australia.7
The UK government could avoid the worsening
epidemic of public drunkenness by not increasing
alcohol availability, by lowering taxes on beverages with
lower alcohol concentrations, and by reducing the limit
for blood alcohol when driving to 0.05%.
If the UK government remains deaf to the
arguments of its critics, it should honour its promise to
evaluate the effects of its policies. Then it would have
the necessary evidence to drop policies that have failed
and replace them with policies that have a chance of
reducing (rather than merely preventing further rises
in) alcohol related harm.
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Regulating the drugs industry transparently
The UK government has not gone far enough in responding to a critical inquiry
Over the past 10-15 years, drug regulatoryauthorities in the United Kingdom andelsewhere have streamlined and accelerated
the review of new drugs in response to claims by the
pharmaceutical industry that over-regulation was stifling
innovation.1 2 Despite these policies, the number of new
molecular entities—a standard measure of innovation in
the industry—submitted to regulatory authorities in the
European Union or United States or launched on the
worldmarket has fallen overall during the past decade.3–5
Between 1993 and 2004, almost double the
number of drugs were withdrawn from the market in
the United Kingdom each year due to lack of safety
than in the previous two decades.6 The withdrawal of
rofecoxib in 2004, affecting millions of patients,
remains an enormous public health issue, as do public
concerns about the safety of the widely prescribed
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.7 8
In this context the House of Commons Health
Select Committee began its wide ranging inquiry into
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, publish-
ing its findings on 5 April 2005.9 Although the
committee acknowledged that the industry makes
excellent contributions to medicine and the UK
economy, the report also highlighted important
concerns about the independence of drug regulation
from the interests of the industry; the need to create
conditions in which the industry will produce more
drugs offering significant therapeutic advance; the
industry’s over-promotion of its products to doctors;
our limited knowledge of drug induced illness; and the
cloak of secrecy around UK regulation during the past
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